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Abstract and Keywords
The early pre-Socratics’ major speculative and critical initiatives—in particular 
Anaximander’s conceptions of the justice of the cosmos and of the apeiron as its archē 
and Xenophanes’s polemics against immorality and anthropomorphism in the depiction of 
the gods and against any claim to divine inspiration—appear to break with Hesiod’s form 
of thought. But the conceptual, critical, and ethical depth of Hesiod’s own rethinking of 
the lore that he inherited complicates this picture. Close examination of each of their 
major initiatives together with the relevant passages in Hesiod shows that even in the 
course of departing from his thought, Anaximander and Xenophanes also reappropriate 
and renew it. A postscript to this chapter poses some questions for future inquiry into 
Heraclitus’s and Parmenides’s receptions of Hesiod.
Keywords: anthropomorphism, apeiron, archē, cosmogony, justice
STUDYING the reception of Hesiod’s thought by Anaximander and Xenophanes is a 
daunting project.  It is not just that we have only fragments and sketchy reports to go on; 
what is more, both these texts and Hesiod’s reflect the development of unprecedented 
modes of thought. As a consequence, almost everything that one ventures to say is 
contestable. Let me begin by acknowledging the obscurity of the depth of each of our 
thinkers, as well as the inevitable danger of circularity that faces any effort to reconstruct 
their relations.
The project is nonetheless compelling. Anaximander and Xenophanes attempt, each in his 
own way, to break free from the mythopoeic tradition, and Hesiod is the most 
philosophical member of that tradition. In their generation of new forms of thought, 
Anaximander and Xenophanes develop possibilities that are arguably implicit, albeit 
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within the mythopoeia they challenge, in Hesiod.  The mix of departure and return is 
veritably Heraclitean.
I begin with Anaximander, then turn to Xenophanes.
Anaximander and Hesiod on the Question of 
the Archē
Anaximander’s Apeiron Archē, Justice, and the Opposites
Anaximander is best known for declaring the archē of the world—that is, the source of the 
sphere of the heavens and the earth—to be to apeiron, “the unlimited.” He is 
objecting to his Milesian predecessor Thales’s view that all things originate from water. 
He evidently agrees with Thales that the archē is something physical, for he holds that to 
apeiron “surrounds and embraces all things” (περιέχειν ἅπαντα). But as the name he 
gives it indicates, he takes it to outstrip every given limit of place (for it lies, untraversibly 
vast, outside the sphere of the heavens), of time (for it is “eternal and ageless”), and of 
kind (for it is qualitatively indefinite, being “neither water nor any other of the so-called 
elements”).
Why does Anaximander reject Thales’s identification of the archē as water, and why does 
he think it to be, instead, indefinite in kind? Our best recourse is Anaximander’s one 
surviving fragment, in which he declares that “[the things that are] perish into the things 
out of which they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution 
to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering of time.” If we ask, for 
what “injustice” committed by, say, A, it would be a proportionate “penalty and 
retribution” for A to “perish into” B, we see that A, by coming to be, must have caused B 
to perish, and also that B must have perished into A; for A’s “perishing” is proportionate 
to its having denied to B its existence, and A’s perishing “into” B, that is, its letting B 
come to be “out of” it, restores to B what it has denied. But this restoration to B, because 
it costs A its existence, is also B’s denial to A of A’s existence. Hence Anaximander 
envisages an endless alternation of crime and reparation, in which each reparation is 
itself a new crime that calls for new reparation. And if we ask what “things that are” 
stand in this reciprocal relation of crime and reparation, in which the coming to be of 
each causes the perishing of the other and vice versa, we see that their mutual negation 
requires that we think of opposites—presumably, as is suggested by other reports, the hot 
and the cold. Anaximander discerns, in the endless alternation of the seasons, the 
fundamental justice that governs the basic conditions of the natural world.
2
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These reflections show why the archē of the world must be “neither water nor any other 
of the so-called elements” but, instead, indefinite in kind. As the ultimate source of all 
else, the archē must itself have no source; hence it is “eternal” (ἀίδιον [Kirk et al. 1983: 
107–8]). Accordingly, for it to be water would be a crime against the dry, for the dry 
would be forever denied coming to be, and the “penalty and retribution” for this 
“injustice” would be forever forestalled. More generally, just insofar as to be qualitatively 
definite is to be subject to having an opposite, for the archē to be qualitatively definite 
would be to make permanent the injustice of its suppressing its opposite. Justice, then, 
requires that the archē be such as to have no opposite, and this requires that it be 
qualitatively indefinite.
These reflections also cast light on the logic that motivates Anaximander’s understanding 
of cosmogenesis. Insofar as the basic powers within the world are the opposites and the 
apeiron is the archē of the world, the coming to be of the world must involve the 
“separating-off of the opposites” from the apeiron. But this must not be understood to 
imply that the opposites initially exist in the apeiron, for this would undermine its 
character of being qualitatively indefinite. Accordingly, Anaximander interposes a middle 
term, which, in the words of Ps.-Plutarch, he characterizes only by its function: “that 
which is productive (γόνιμον) … of hot and cold.” (Kirk et al. 1983: 131) In the 
first phase of cosmogenesis this “productive” something is “separated off” from the 
eternal apeiron, and in the second phase it somehow produces the hot and the cold and, 
so, the world; thus the apeiron itself remains unqualified by the opposites.
Hesiod’s Cosmogony: The Justice of the Whole
To appreciate the way in which Anaximander’s notion of the apeiron archē responds to 
Hesiod, we must first mark and interpret the key cosmogonic passage in the Theogony
(hereafter Th), 116–33:
First of all, Chaos was born (γένετ’); then next
Broad-breasted Earth, a firm seat forever for all
The immortals who hold the peaks of snowy Olympus,
And misty Tartara in the depths under the wide-wayed ground,
And Eros, handsomest among the deathless gods,
A looser of limbs, who in all the gods and all human beings
Overpowers in their breasts their intelligence and careful planning.
And from Chaos were born both Erebos and dark Night,
And from Night, in turn, were born both Aither and Day,
Whom she conceived and bore after joining in love with Erebos.
But Earth first brought forth, as an equal to herself,
Starry Sky, so that he might cover her all over,
In order to be a firm seat forever for the blessed gods,
(p. 209) 
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And she brought forth the tall Mountains, pleasing haunts of the goddess
Nymphs who make their homes in the forested hills,
And also she bore the barren main with its raging swell,
Sea, all without any sweet act of love; then next,
Having lain with Sky, she bore deep-swirling Ocean… .
Even before exploring these lines in detail, we can hardly fail to be impressed by the 
break in mode of thought represented by Anaximander’s notion of the apeiron. Hesiod 
belongs to the mythopoeic tradition, and he proceeds by letting a series of vivid images 
unfold before his hearer; Anaximander, by contrast, makes inventive use of a term that, 
even while it brings to mind the picture of a vast expanse, also resists picture thinking 
itself. What is without outer bounds of place and time and qualitatively indefinite defies 
the individuating borders and qualitative determinateness that the constitution of a 
picture requires; one feels oneself challenged by Anaximander to enter unfamiliar 
thought space, the space of the abstract or purely conceptual. This, however, is only the 
beginning, not the end of the matter of Anaximander’s relation to Hesiod. For in a 
different but analogous way, Hesiod too enters unfamiliar thought space when at 
Th 105–10 he prepares the way for his cosmogony; in the course of his appeal to the 
Muses to
sound out the holy stock of the everlasting immortals
who were born from Earth (Γῆς) and starry Sky
and gloomy Night, whom briny Sea brought to maturity,
and tell how at the first gods (θεοί) … [,]
he makes a subtle but nonetheless sudden shift, here in the middle of line 108,  from 
straightforwardly anthropomorphic characterization of the gods to transparently cosmic 
characterization, shifting from the person figures of 105–8 to the sorts of structures and 
conditions of the natural world that these person figures represent:
        … and earth (καὶ γαῖα) were born
and rivers and boundless sea, raging in its swell,
and shining stars and wide sky above all.
What is more, some of the key structures Hesiod will introduce in the cosmogony do not 
belong to the visible natural world. Hence we must be ready to ask, before we settle on 
the contrasts we have begun to draw between his and Anaximander’s language, whether 
and to what degree Hesiod too, even in the medium of vivid mythopoeic imagery, is 
pressing toward an abstract thought content.
Let me now venture a reading of the main lines of thought in Th 116–33. This will put us 
in position to return to Anaximander and begin to mark the ways his proposal of an 
apeiron archē responds to Hesiod. I proceed in five steps:
(p. 210) 
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(1) The first four: Chaos, Earth, Tartara, and Eros (116–22). Though the first four 
beings are “born” (γένετ’, 116), Hesiod refrains from naming a parent and, indeed, 
from asserting any sibling relations. What he offers instead is the vision of an event 
that is partly topological, partly logical. His word Chaos derives from the root cha-
and signifies the sort of “gap” that appears, to cite a cognate, in a “yawn” (χάσκειν, 
χαίνειν). The birth of Chaos is the topological event of the opening of a gap in what 
can only be thought of retrospectively as a hitherto undifferentiated field, and the 
opening brings along with it, in its immediate aftermath (“next”), the emergence of 
Earth and Tartaros as its two sides. The birth of Eros is, strange to say, a logical 
event. Eros is not to be envisaged as a thing in space but rather is the force that 
draws spatially distinct partners together, and its birth therefore presupposes and 
complements the birth of Chaos.
(2) The character of Tartara. To appreciate the motivation of the subsequent series of 
births in the cosmogony, it is important to keep in the mind’s eye a vivid image of 
Tartaros. As the underworld, it is as far below the Earth, separated from it by Chaos 
(814), as the Earth is below the Sky (720–25). It is a “vast chasm” (740), and its 
darkness—it is associated with Erebos and filled with “murk” or “gloom” (729, 
also 653, 659) and “mist” (119, 721, 729, 736 [= 807])—and its “dank, 
moldy” character (731, 739 [= 810]) prevent any distinct contours or shapes from 
appearing to sight and touch. Indeed, were a man so unlucky as to fall into it, 
“stormblast upon stormblast would sweep him one way and another” (742), making it 
impossible for him to get his bearings; as the onomatopoeia of its name suggests, it 
is characterized by unceasing disturbance. These vivid details help to explain the 
curious fact that Hesiod first names Tartaros in the plural, Tartara; a being so lacking 
in internal structure must also lack integrity.
(p. 211) 
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(3) The offspring of Chaos (123–25) and Earth (126–33): two kinds of order in 
interplay. The topological event of the opening of the gap that separates Earth and 
Tartaros is only the first, in itself incomplete step in Hesiod’s vision of cosmogenesis; 
Earth and Tartaros only receive their full specificities as Earth and as Tartaros 
through the further offspring of Chaos and Earth. These births exhibit two kinds of 
relation, and in their fitting together these constitute the order of the cosmos as a 
whole. First, already prefigured by the complementing of Chaos by Eros, there is a 
being’s need, if it is to have its full specificity, for its opposite; thus Chaos’s first-
born, the spatial and temporal powers of darkness, Erebos and Night, together beget 
their correlative opposites, Aither and Day. By these begettings Erebos expresses his 
need, if he is to be the darkness of the underworld, for there also to be the 
brightness of the upper sky, Aither, and Night expresses her need, if she is to be the 
time of darkness, for there also to be the time of light, Day. Second, there is a 
whole’s need, if it is to have genuine wholeness, for its articulation into parts. Hesiod 
displays this by having Earth bear, by and within herself, Mountains and Sea; thus 
Earth gives herself the internal differentiation essential to her as Earth. What is 
more, these two kinds of relation, each of which is itself a kind of complementarity, 
also complement one another. That a being’s need for its opposite can complete a 
whole’s self-differentiation is already evident in Earth’s bearing of Mountains and 
Sea: as “tall,” “forested,” and the “pleasing haunts of nymphs,” Mountains stand in 
determinate contrast with the low, “barren,” and “raging swell” of Sea. More striking 
still is the way this self-differentiation completes Earth’s acquiring of her opposite, 
Sky: when Earth first bears, “as an equal to herself, starry Sky,” they are merely two 
undifferentiated masses, with Sky “covering [Earth] all over” without, however, 
standing in any qualitative contrast to her; by giving birth to Mountains and Sea, 
however, Earth makes herself into—as, now, a differentiated whole—the opposite to 
the undifferentiated expanse of Sky. That this achievement of qualitative contrast 
allows them to fit together as opposites, Hesiod lets us see in the final begetting of 
the cosmogony: Earth now lies with Sky and together they beget “deep swirling 
Ocean,” the circular stream that, flowing around Earth at the farthest horizon, forms 
the continuous “point of contact between earth and the enclosing bowl of sky” (Kirk 
et al. 1983: 36n1)—thus Earth and Sky join together, constituting the upper world as 
a whole.
(4) Hesiod’s vision of the cosmic whole. This constitution of the upper world of Earth 
and Sky is, in turn, both the analog to and the completion of the constitution of 
the cosmos as a whole. If, letting ourselves “see” the process of 
cosmogenesis unfold, we keep vividly in the mind’s eye the character of Tartaros as a 
“vast chasm” without either internal structure or integrity, we will see that just as 
the upper world is constituted as the whole of the internally differentiated whole of 
Earth, with its Mountains and Sea, and undifferentiated Sky, so the cosmos in its 
entirety is constituted as the whole of the differentiated whole of the upper world 
and undifferentiated Tartaros.
(p. 212) 
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(5) The cosmogony as the visible expression of the justice of Zeus. I spoke at the 
outset of the “abstract thought content” that, in the medium of his vivid imagery, 
Hesiod presses toward. If we now set the cosmogony within the context of the Th as 
a whole and, in turn, set the Th together with the Works and Days (hereafter WD), we 
can make out this content. The main body of the Th tells the story of the victory of 
Zeus over the Titans. This victory does not consist, as did Kronos’s victory over 
Ouranos, merely of the violent taking of supreme power; rather, it consists of Zeus’s 
introduction of the rule of justice, that is, of that proper apportioning that prevents 
the need for violence in the first place. Zeus’s first three acts after driving the Titans 
into Tartaros are to “distribute well among [the gods who fought with him] their 
titles and privileges” (885, cf. 66–67 and 74); to swallow Metis and with her inside 
him give birth to Athena, “the equal of her father in wise counsel and strength”
(896); and with Themis (justice as established by custom) to beget “Good 
Order” (Εὐνομίην), Justice, and Peace” (901–2). In the WD, in turn, Zeus ordains the 
rule of justice for human beings. The crux of justice is to restrict one’s reach to “the 
half” that is one’s own rather than to try to seize “the whole” for oneself (WD 40); 
respecting boundaries, each party allows the other its due. The cosmogony gives 
visible form to this idea of justice. Beginning with the birth of Chaos, it makes 
central the differentiation that gives rise to Earth and Tartaros, and at each step 
along its vivid way it matches part and counterpart in a nested whole. To mark this 
for ourselves by tracing from the innermost parts to the outermost whole: we are 
shown the pairs of Mountains and Sea, of the thereby differentiated Earth and 
undifferentiated Sky, and of the thereby differentiated upper world and 
undifferentiated Tartaros. Thus the cosmogony images the formation of a world in 
which it is appropriate, because its differentiations and pairings express the idea of 
justice as its ordering principle, for a just Zeus to come to prevail.
9
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Anaximander’s Critical Response (Reconstructed) to Hesiod’s 
Cosmogony
How does Anaximander’s thought respond to Hesiod’s? We have no surviving explicit 
evidence—no text of Anaximander’s referring to Hesiod—to guide us. What we can do, 
however, is to set Anaximander’s notions of the apeiron archē and the interplay of the 
opposites against the background of Th 116–33; if we do, three observations present 
themselves. First, while for Anaximander the coming into being of each of the 
opposites negates the other’s existence, the requirement of justice reflects his 
recognition of the need that each has for the other; that each must pay reparation to the 
other “for [its] injustice” attests that the being of each requires the being of the other. 
Thus Anaximander shares the understanding that leads Hesiod to balance the being of 
Night with that of Day and, more generally, to structure the cosmos as a complex of 
counterbalancing opposites. Indeed, it is precisely because he agrees with Hesiod in 
letting his thought be guided by justice that Anaximander challenges Thales, rejecting the 
privileging of the wet over the dry. Second, this very agreement also leads Anaximander 
to challenge Hesiod—albeit, remarkably, in a way that Hesiod’s portrayal of the birth of 
Chaos itself seems to invite. Just insofar as the differentiation that first begins to bring 
the world into being occurs as a “birth” (γένετ’, Th 116), there would seem to need to be 
a parent. But what sort of being could precede the birth of Chaos and play this role? 
Insofar as it is only with this first differentiation, the gapping of Earth and Tartaros, that 
the world begins, this presupposed parent would seem to have to be an undifferentiated, 
indefinite, and—lacking any other to delimit it in place or time—boundless being. Thus 
Anaximander’s conception of the apeiron archē in effect challenges Hesiod’s beginning by 
making explicit the still more primal being that the birth of Chaos itself silently 
presupposes!  Third, and as already noted, by giving his conception the strikingly 
transparent name a-peiron, Anaximander takes a decisive step beyond Hesiodic 
mythopoeia and toward the non-imagistic conceptual thinking that will eventually prevail, 
above all with Parmenides, in the emerging philosophic tradition; again, however, it is a 
step that, as the implicit conceptual order of Hesiod’s cosmogony makes palpable, 
Hesiod’s own thinking itself in effect invites.
Xenophanes and Hesiod on the Representation 
and Knowledge of the Divine
Xenophanes’s reception of Hesiod is both indirect and critical. In our few surviving 
fragments, he mentions Hesiod only once, lumping him together with Homer (fr. 11.1)
and objecting to their attributing immoral conduct to the gods. But Hesiod is no less an 
implicit target in Xenophanes’s critical remarks on anthropomorphism and the nature of 
(p. 213) 
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the divine and in his declarations of the limits and source of human understanding. We 
shall consider each of these three concerns in turn.
Xenophanes’s Moral-Political Qualms—and Hesiod’s
Xenophanes claims a “wisdom” (σοφίη, 2.12) that contributes uniquely to the city’s being 
“in good order” (ἐν εὐνομίῃ, 2.19) and prospering (2.22). On the basis of this “wisdom” 
he urges that humans “always show respect for the gods” and declares that there 
is nothing χρηστόν—morally right or (in Lesher’s translation) “useful”—in portraying 
them in “battles” and “furious conflicts” such as the Titanomachy (1.21–24); similar 
concerns, presumably, lead him to object to “Homer[’s] and Hesiod[’s] attributing to the 
gods all the things which are matters of disgrace and censure among humans, thieving 
and adultery (μοιχεύειν) and deceiving one another” (11.1–3; also 12.2). Whereas the 
former portrayals might tempt the citizenry too easily to enter into foreign wars or even, 
recalling that the Titanomachy was a conflict between two generations of the same family, 
into internecine violence, the latter might be mistaken to legitimize violations of the 
proprieties of property and marriage and of the bond of trust that the unity of the city 
requires. Moral-political “wisdom” therefore proscribes portraying the gods as engaged 
in violent or immorally acquisitive comportment.
What is the bearing of this on Hesiod? First, Xenophanes’s thought seems to key not from 
any idea of moral perfection but rather from a normative respect for what is properly 
another’s—be this another’s property or spouse or, indeed, city—and from an idea of the 
“good order” and prosperity that maintaining this respect enables for a community. This 
is strikingly Hesiodic. “Fools, all,” Hesiod exclaims at WD 40, “who know not how much 
greater is the half than the whole!” Sticking to what is one’s own, not trying to seize by 
force the “half” that is another’s, but rather working on one’s own land in “good strife” 
with one’s neighbor, is the practice of the ethic of justice and work that will avoid the 
worst, each party’s losing everything in “bad strife,” and enable the best, peace and 
plenty for all. It is, then, a Hesiodic moral-political order that Xenophanes supports by 
striking from poetry and lore portrayals of the gods that fail to “show respect for [them].”
There are, of course, conspicuous cases in Hesiod’s poems of various gods comporting 
themselves in the objectionable ways that Xenophanes decries. The “furious conflict” of 
the Titanomachy lies at the heart of the Th, and it is preceded by the tales of the violence 
and counter-violence of Sky and Kronos and followed by the tale of Zeus’s battle against 
the monster Typhoeus. Attempted deception and theft are key moments in the extended 
tale, told once in the Th (521–616) and again in the WD (42–104), of Zeus’s contest with 
Prometheus and the fashioning of Pandora. But a closer look at his representation of 
Zeus, in particular, shows that Hesiod is already guided by the moral-political scruples 
that motivate Xenophanes. First, the point of Zeus’s violence against the Titans is to put 
an end to the very rule of violence that they stand for and replace it with the rule of 
justice; as we have already observed, Zeus’s first acts after securing victory are to 
distribute power to the other Olympians, to beget his “equal in wise counsel and 
(p. 214) 
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strength,” and with Themis, to beget “Good Order, Justice, and Peace.” Second, in the 
Pandora story it is not Zeus but Prometheus who is the primary thief and deceiver; Zeus’s 
“deception” (WD 83) in ordering the fashioning of Pandora is a punishment that brings 
home the inescapability of a life of work.  Third, in the long catalog of Zeus’s many 
fatherings at Th 886–944, there is no mention of the salacious comportment—the varieties 
of μοιχεύειν—attributed to him in so much of the lore that Hesiod inherited from archaic 
myth; especially the old tales of Zeus’s beddings of Leto, Maia, Semele, and Alkmene 
provided rich material for portraying his variously opportunistic, shape-shifting, 
and exploitative philanderings, but in each case the poem forgoes this, restricting itself 
instead to naming the glorious offspring by which Zeus distributes his powers to later 
generations. Doesn’t Hesiod in each of these ways morally sanitize his portrait of Zeus
along the lines—albeit not to the full extent—that Xenophanes later demands? Seen in 
this light, the notion of Xenophanes as a critic of “Homer and Hesiod” gives way to the 
notion of Xenophanes as extending what is already Hesiod’s moral-political “wisdom” in 
portraying Zeus.
Xenophanes’s Critique of Anthropomorphism and His Reconception 
of the God(s): Two Questions
Xenophanes reconceives the divine by reflections that are at once negative and positive. 
Exposing the tendency to project onto the gods our own ethnic looks (“snub-nosed and 
black,” “blue-eyed and red-haired,” 16.1–2), body types (“horses would draw the figures 
of the gods as similar to horses,” etc., 15), powers (“voice,” 14.2), and manners 
(“clothing,” 14.2), he reimagines the divine as in the highest possible degree “not at all 
like mortals in body or in thought” (23.2). Hence he pictures the divine as having no 
distinct and localized organs of consciousness—rather, “all [of him] sees, all [of him] 
thinks, all [of him] hears” (24); he imagines the divine as “remain[ing] in the same 
[place], not moving at all”—for “it is not fitting for him to travel to different places at 
different times” (26.1–2); and, indeed, he regards the divine as having no need to move—
for he is radically unlike mortals not only in his mind and in his body but also in the very 
relation between these: “completely without effort he shakes all things by the thought of 
his mind” (25).
Two sets of questions should confront any effort to interpret these declarations. The first 
is motivated by a seeming gap in Xenophanes’s thought. Is the “showing [of] respect for 
the gods” that strips away morally objectionable acts compatible with the reconception of 
the divine that strips away anthropomorphic characters? That is, does the conception of 
the divine that is reached by setting aside every limiting character that critical reflection 
on anthropomorphic projection can discern—from particular looks and specific body type 
to the distinctions between faculties of consciousness and even between the powers of 
body and mind themselves—allow for or contradict the attribution to the divine of any 
distinctively moral characters of goodness and justice?
12
(p. 215) 
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The second set of questions has motivated my use of the vague phrase, “the divine,” in 
these last two paragraphs. Is Xenophanes a monotheist? To focus on the key fragment, 
23, how should we hear the first two words, Εἷς θεὸς, as they lead into the rest of the first 
line, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος? Is εἷς, “one,” a predicate, yielding the line 
“god is one, greatest among both gods and humans,” or is it attributive, yielding the line 
“one god is greatest among gods and humans”? If we take εἷς as a predicate and hear εἷς 
θεὸς as a declaration of monotheism, we immediately face another question: How should 
we understand the reference to “gods” in the very next phrase—and, multiplying the 
difficulty, in its appearance in at least seven other fragments: 1.24, 11.1, 14.1, 15.3, 16.1, 
18.1, and 34.2? It is not implausible to hear the phrase “among both gods and 
humans” in 23.1 as typically Xenophanean provocative irony; as a quasi-Homeric and 
Hesiodic formula, it challenges his hearers to recognize the contrast with their 
anthropomorphic polytheism that Xenophanes’s insight into the “greatness” of the divine, 
under his new conception, requires. But it is no less plausible to take the plural reference 
to “gods” in 23.1 and the other fragments to indicate that Xenophanes, even while he 
elevates his “one god” above all others, continues to affirm the reality of these others; in 
this view, Xenophanes is less a revolutionary who overthrows traditional polytheism than 
a revisionist who leaves in place the idea of a plurality of gods, whoever and however 
they may be, even while claiming an extraordinary primacy for his “one god.”
How we respond to these two sets of questions will have major implications for our 
understanding of Xenophanes’s reception of Hesiod. If we take Xenophanes to have 
pushed his stripping away of anthropomorphic characters so far that he holds back from 
attributing not just vices but virtues as well to the divine, then we take him to abandon 
his own moral-political “wisdom,” for such a divinity—whether one or many—would have 
no attributes qualifying it to serve as a source of moral-political order for human beings, 
much less as a moral paradigm; such a divinity would make no contribution to the 
establishment or maintenance of the “good order” of the city. And since, as we have 
argued, in his moral-political “wisdom” Xenophanes extends rather than opposes Hesiod’s 
own, a Xenophanes whose anti-anthropomorphic theology undercuts his moral-political 
“wisdom” would undercut Hesiod’s as well. On the other hand, turning to the second set 
of questions, if we take Xenophanes to be a polytheistic revisionist, then the path is open 
for taking his theology to remain consistent with his moral-political “wisdom” and with 
Hesiod’s as well; a “one god” who is at once the “greatest” and yet remains situated 
“among both gods and men” would be an analog to Hesiod’s Zeus in the exalted status 
Zeus achieves by his victories over the Titans and Typhoeus. And it would remain open to 
Xenophanes, limiting his project of de-anthropomorphization in favor of his less radical 
drive to purge our representations of the divine of any trace of violence or vice, to credit 
his “one god” with maximally virtuous relations to the other gods and to human beings; as 
a lordly figure comporting himself with goodness and justice, such a god would be, even if 
in other ways “not at all like mortals,” a distillation of the essence of Hesiod’s still 
anthropomorphic figure of the father of “Good Order, Justice, and Peace.” A Xenophanes 
(p. 216) 
14
The Reception of Hesiod by the Early Pre-Socratics
Page 12 of 20
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 11 August 2018
who took this course would be consistent both with his own moral-political “wisdom” and 
with Hesiod’s.
Xenophanes—and Hesiod?—on the Limits and Means of Human 
Understanding
That we are reduced to outlining alternative possibilities may be the consequence of the 
fact that, as Aristotle famously complained, Xenophanes “made nothing 
clear” (Metaphysics 986b22–23). But Xenophanes himself might reply that it is rather 
a consequence of the fact that “the clear truth” (τὸ … σαφές) is beyond the reach 
of human beings. In frs. 34 and 18, Xenophanes marks the limits and sources of human 
understanding:
And the clear truth no human has seen, nor will there be anyone
Who knows about the gods and about all the things of which I speak.
For even if a person should happen to say most fully what is perfectly so,
All the same he himself would not know it; for opinion (δόκος) is allotted to all.
(34.1–4)
By no means did the gods reveal all things to mortals from the beginning,
But in time, by searching (or “examining,” ζητοῦντες), they discover better.
(18.1–2)
As before, the bearing of these reflections on Hesiod is complex. On the one hand, Hesiod 
bases his claim to know about the gods on the “fact,” as he sings in the proem to the Th,
that the Muses visited him on Mt. Helicon and, “breath[ing] into me a divine voice, … 
commanded me to hymn the race of the blessed gods everlasting” (Th 31–33). If, as his 
shift from imperatives to the Muses in lines 104–15 to the indicative at line 116 implies 
we should, we take the Th from line 116 on as his channeling of the Muses’ reply to his 
imperatives, then we will take Hesiod to be claiming that the Th is divinely inspired and 
informed. Should we take Hesiod’s report of the Muses’ visit literally? If we do, then we 
make him a likely target of Xenophanes’s denial in the opening clause of fr. 18: “By no 
means did the gods reveal all things to mortals from the beginning.”
On the other hand, a variety of considerations should lead us to hesitate to take Hesiod’s 
report at face value. West has identified six “conventional elements” in the proem, 
namely, that the “poet, prophet, or lawgiver who receives instructions” “on a mountain 
where the god lives” works there as a “shepherd” and that the god—that is, in our 
passage the Muses—first address him “in strongly derogatory terms,” only then to give 
him “a visible token of [their] ‘call’ ” and to “grant [him] eloquence.”  That Hesiod 
assembles “conventional elements” in composing his song of the Muses is interpretively 
significant. It invites us to suspend the ascription of naiveté not only to Hesiod but also to 
at least some significant part of his projected audience and to wonder what different sorts 
of conscious activity—different, that is, than channeling the divine voices of the Muses—
(p. 217) 
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he was engaged in and, what is more, understood that his most sophisticated hearers 
would also know him to be engaged in. There is no reason to doubt that Hesiod intends 
his song of the Muses’ visit, both in its content and in its spell-binding beauty, to 
constitute a claim to extraordinary insight. But the sophisticated poet and his most 
sophisticated hearers would recognize this insight as the result of the deliberate 
deployment of his no less extraordinary, nonetheless human powers of critical and 
creative thought. And for those who understand Hesiod’s poetry this way, Xenophanes’s 
words are—surprisingly, on first hearing—not polemically dismissive but, quite the 
contrary, helpfully illuminating. For in a number of ways, Hesiod, like 
Xenophanes, appears to be “searching” (or “examining”) the tradition he has inherited 
and “discover[ing] better.”
Detailing all of these ways would require a full study of the Th and the WD; let it suffice 
here to note four. (1) The Muses’ alert at Th 27–28. When Hesiod has the Muses declare 
that
We know how to say many false things that seem like truths,
But we also know how, when we wish, to proclaim truths,
he portrays them as at once acknowledging that they have spoken falsely to others in the 
past and challenging him to rise above his mundane consciousness in order to discern the 
truth in what they will now say. Xenophanes’s words help us put this twofold point more 
directly: Hesiod acknowledges that he has arrived at the insight he will now utter at least 
in part by “examining” what others have claimed to have learned from the Muses, and he 
challenges his hearers, by sharing in the critical work of “examin[ing]” and 
“discover[ing]” that he has done, to see why what he will now claim really is “better.” (2) 
Finding genealogical and ethical order among the many gods. In one massive respect 
that, nonetheless, is largely hidden from us, the whole of the Th is the result of such a 
“discovering better.” Hesiod takes the vast aggregate of stories about the gods—stories 
that range from obscure and local to widely known and that tell of all manner of major 
and minor gods—and, selecting and reshaping them to fit within his alternating 
genealogical and epic narrative, integrates them within his overall account of Zeus’s 
accession to power and establishment of justice. This extraordinary work of “examining” 
and “discovering better” is largely hidden, however, by its very success; whatever 
elements there may have been in the heterogeneous plurality of stories he inherited that 
resisted the requirements of his genealogical and ethical vision, he presumably revised or 
left out. (3) Several such revisions and omissions, recalled. We have just noted an 
extended set of such revisions and omissions. In the Th Hesiod treats Zeus’s violence as 
his necessary means for replacing violence itself by the rule of justice, and in his 
genealogical account of Zeus’s offspring Hesiod suppresses many of the details of abusive 
sexual aggression that we know from other sources; by “examining” the tales of Zeus that 
he inherited and by removing what would otherwise have presented themselves as signal 
inconsistencies, Hesiod clears the way for his subsequent celebration of Zeus in the WD
as the ordainer of the ethic of justice and work for human beings. (4) Selective de-
anthropomorphizations of the representations of the gods. We have also noted what we 
(p. 218) 
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can now mark as a strikingly proto-Xenophanean way in which Hesiod “discovers” what is 
“better” than what he inherits: in order to establish the very terms needed for a genuine 
cosmogony, he has to partly de-anthropomorphize the figures of the great cosmic gods in 
Th 116–33. As he indicates in advance by his transition from “gods” to “earth” at Th 108, 
he shifts focus from the familiar personifications of the structures of nature to these 
structures themselves. Nor is this an isolated case. In at least four other sets of passages 
he undercuts anthropomorphism by giving as the names of gods nouns that call to mind 
not persons but impersonal qualities or principles: at Th 77–79 (to be heard against the 
background of 65–72), he distinguishes and names each of the nine Muses—
hitherto an undifferentiated host—by picking out qualities of the experience of 
inspiration; at 211–25 he names as the children of Night a host of the mostly fearsome 
conditions that assail us as threats and worries in the darkness of night; at 226–32 he 
extends this doleful list by elaborating as the offspring of Discord many of its damaging 
consequences; and at 902, as already noted, he names as the children of Zeus and Themis 
“Good Order” and “Justice” and “Peace.”
Postscript: Heraclitus and Parmenides
If space allowed, I would extend these reflections to Heraclitus and Parmenides. As with 
Anaximander and Xenophanes, so here, the task of interpreting Heraclitus’s and 
Parmenides’s receptions of Hesiod is inseparable from the task of interpreting Heraclitus 
and Parmenides themselves. Following are some basic issues to explore.
(p. 219) 
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Heraclitus and Hesiod
Unity. How much elicitative irony should we find in Heraclitus’s anti-Hesiodic polemics? It 
is surprising enough to hear the poet who integrated cosmogony, theogony, and ethics 
derided as a “polymath” (40);  it is more than surprising to hear Heraclitus charge that 
Hesiod—whose unforgettable image of Night and Day exchanging a greeting as they pass 
each other at dawn and dusk at the edge of the underworld (Th 748–57) makes explicit 
that night’s need for day, first expressed at Th 124–25, is reciprocal—“did not understand 
[that] night and day … are one” (57). On a straightforward reading, Heraclitus faults 
Hesiod for representing as separate individuals what are really phase and counter-phase 
of a cyclical unity. But is there, in this apparent “differing” with Hesiod, a “hidden 
harmony” (51, 54)? Does Heraclitus seek to elicit from the hearer moved to come to 
Hesiod’s defense the very recognition of the unity of opposites that he only ironically 
claims Hesiod misses?
Justice and strife. Does Heraclitus oppose the one-sidedness of Hesiod’s vision of a 
divinely established order of “Good Order and Justice and Peace” (Th 902) by his tragic 
insight that “justice is strife” (δίκην ἔριν, 80) and that “war,” not Zeus, “is the father … 
and the king of all” (53)? Or does δίκην ἔριν mean, as well, that “strife is justice,” and is 
the elision of “Zeus” meant to summon to mind, not banish, Hesiod’s Zeus and the 
“Justice” he fathers as the redeeming significance of “war”? In an analogous way, does 
Heraclitus object to Hesiod’s distinction between the two “strifes” (WD 11–26)—or does 
he, understanding their inextricability, credit Hesiod’s recognition that the rule of justice 
is no less a mode of “strife” than is its violation?
The god. How does Heraclitus’s “the god,” in some sense the very unity of each pair of 
opposites (67, also 102), relate to Hesiod’s theology? If Heraclitus takes a Xenophanean 
perspective in declaring that “the wise, one alone, is unwilling … to be called by 
the name of Zeus,” does he at the same time counter and integrate this with a Hesiodic 
perspective when, seemingly contradicting himself, he also declares that “the wise … is 
willing” to be so called (32)? But why would “the wise” be “willing”? Does Heraclitus, 
imitating the enigmatic voice of “the lord whose oracle is at Delphi” (93), provoke us to 
find in “the name of Zeus”—that is, of the warrior for justice that Hesiod has portrayed 
Zeus to be—a “sign” (93) of that unity of opposites that, also signified by the Zeusian 
“thunderbolt,” “steers all things” (64)?
Parmenides and Hesiod
What “is.” For Parmenides’s reception of Hesiod, inquiry should focus on Parmenides’s 
appropriation of Th 748–57 in his image of “the gates of the ways of Night and 
Day” (1.11). In his proem, to reach the goddess who teaches the thought of what “is” (… 
ἔστιν, 2.3, 8.3), the traveler must arrive at and then pass through these gates; thus 
Parmenides grants to the insight symbolized by arriving at the gateway of opposites the 
18
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status of a necessary but insufficient stage of understanding. This raises a nexus of 
compelling questions. Restricting ourselves first to Parmenides, what is the insight 
symbolized by the arrival at the gateway, and what is the process of thinking by which, 
upon reaching this insight, the traveler finds himself able to pass beyond it to the 
goddess? Second, turning to Parmenides’s relation to Hesiod, does Parmenides mean to 
mark the limit of Hesiodic thinking and to claim to have gone beyond it—or does he, 
either alternatively or in addition, mean to imply that the possibility of passing beyond 
the gateway and on to the discovery of the thought of what “is” is already to be found, if 
only implicitly and without the goddess’s new language, in Hesiod?
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Notes:
(1.) Due to limits of space I have deferred discussion of Heraclitus and Parmenides. See 
the postscript for an anticipation.
(2.) I strongly second Clay’s remark that “[it] is past time … to discard the antiquated 
notion of Hesiod’s primitive simplicity and to accept the possibility that he may be fully 
aware of the implications of his own words” (2003: 59).
(3.) These characterizations of Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον are first reported by Aristotle 
and Theophrastus; see Kirk et al. (1983: 106ff., 115).
(4.) My translation, with help from Lattimore (1959); Athanassakis (2004); Most (2006); 
and the editors of this volume.
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(5.) We face a textual uncertainty in lines 118 and 119. Both are disputed, and the stakes 
are high. If, following Plato at Symposium 178b, we excise both lines, there are only 
three, not four, primordial beings; Tartaros drops out. Moreover, there is a dissenting 
construal of the grammar that has the same consequence. On the widely accepted 
reading by West (1966), Τάρταρα is a nominative plural and takes the same verb 
γενετ’ (116) that Chaos, then Earth (117), and then Eros (120), also take; these four are 
the primordial beings in Hesiod’s cosmogony. On the dissenting construal, recently 
defended by Most (2004: 175–80), τάρταρα at line 119 is an accusative and, paired with 
κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου, forms a compound object of ἔχουσι at 118; hence Tartaros and 
the “peaks of Olympos” play the secondary role of being parts of Earth, and Tartaros is 
not one of the primordial powers—nor, I would note, does it have its own distinct birth. I 
follow West’s judgment that “118 is a formula complete in itself, and unlikely to be 
continued [into 119]” (1966: 194). In addition, Hesiod’s later characterization of Tartaros 
as dark, moldy, ceaselessly stormy, and hateful to the gods (739) makes it problematic to 
think of it as forming a part of a “firm seat forever for all the immortals.” Most important, 
the pairing of Tartaros with Earth as the two equi-primordial “sides” of the gap formed by 
the birth of Chaos plays a crucial role in the order that Hesiod discerns in the cosmos at 
116–33; that 119 be read to grant this status to Tartaros is essential to the balance and 
coherence to which every other cosmic birth in 116–33 contributes. (Thanks to Rachel 
Kitzinger for discussion of these issues.)
(6.) West (1966: 190) comments that the phrase θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα—“gods and earth”—in line 
108 is “a little surprising, since Earth and the things that follow are themselves divine. To 
Hesiod’s audience θεοί would suggest primarily the non-cosmic gods.” The force of the 
“and,” in other words, is to indicate that the terms that follow—“earth,” “rivers,” 
“boundless sea,” “shining stars,” “wide sky”—are to be thought of not in the manner of 
the characterizations in lines 105–7, that is, as the anthropomorphized “non-cosmic 
gods,” but rather as structures and features of the cosmos.
(7.) To state explicitly what I hope is already clear, Hesiod’s shift of focus from 
anthropomorphic person figures to what they represent introduces and is restricted to 
the cosmogony (116–33). That he reverts to a full personification of Earth and Sky in the 
rest of the poem makes his shift away from it in the cosmogony all the more conspicuous 
and, as an achievement in thinking, impressive.
(8.) For a more detailed exegesis of Th 116–33 together with a focused refutation of the 
once standard interpretation, offered by Cornford (1950), that the birth of Chaos is the 
splitting of Earth and Sky, see Miller (2001).
(9.) This complex act has a Heraclitean paradoxicality. In short, for Zeus to swallow Metis 
seems to represent the extreme form of the injustice of Sky and of Kronos; whereas Sky 
keeps all power for himself by pushing his children back into mother Earth’s womb and 
Kronos one-ups this violence by swallowing his children, Zeus now seems to one-up 
Kronos by swallowing the mother before the child is born. But the upshot of his act points 
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to a contrary significance: Zeus, who now has Metis within him to “counsel him about 
good and evil” (Th 900), gives birth to his “equal”—that is, rather than foolishly and 
violently hoarding all power for himself, he wisely and morally shares it.
(10.) Surprisingly, this may not be the last word. Two passages, Th 726–28 and 736–39, 
provide evidence that Hesiod himself both identified this primordial being as Tartaros and 
deliberately held back from giving it pride of place, subordinating it, instead, to Chaos. 
Could it be that Hesiod in effect anticipated and, well in advance, objected to 
Anaximander’s granting τὸ ἄπειρον the status of ἀρχή? For interpretive discussion, see 
Miller (2001).
(11.) The numbers are those in Lesher (1992), following Diels-Kranz (1951).
(12.) What, however, of the “deception” Zeus employs in swallowing Metis (Th 889–90)? 
See note 9.
(13.) Scully (2015: 43–45, 47–48).
(14.) Cf. Lesher (1992: 98–100).
(15.) I follow Lesher’s translation of the final clause.
(16.) West (1966: 159–60), citing Dornseiff (1959: 37–38, 76); Trencsényi-Waldapfel (1955: 
45–76).
(17.) For Hesiod’s naming of the Muses and the offspring of Discord, see Scully in this 
volume, pp. 86–88.
(18.) Fragment numbers for Heraclitus and Parmenides are those in Diels-Kranz (1951).
(19.) For discussion, see Miller (2006).
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